Pricing Schemes for Metropolitan Traffic Data Markets

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Abstract: Data marketplaces provide platforms for management of large data sets. The data markets are rapidly growing, yet the pricing strategies for data and data analytics are not yet well-understood. In this paper, we explore some of the pricing schemes applicable to data marketplaces in the context of transportation traffic data. This includes historical and real-time freeway and arterial congestion data. We investigate pricing raw sensor data vs. processed information (e.g., prediction of traffic patterns or route planning services) and show that, under natural assumptions, the raw data should be priced higher than processed information.

1 INTRODUCTION

Big data marketplaces, such as Microsoft Azure1 and Infochimps2 are rapidly growing (Furrier, 2012; Lohr, 2011). These data marketplaces offer a platform for data providers to upload and store their data as well as to share with and sell their data to their clients. Unlike more established online market such as Internet advertising and cloud computing, data marketplaces are still experimenting with difference pricing strategies (Schomm et al., 2013; Muschalle et al., 2013). In this paper, we investigate the pricing aspects of designing data marketplaces with focus on traffic data.

Traffic congestion is a growing problem in many metropolitan areas. It not only wastes our time and energy, but also increases air pollution. According to Texas Transportation Institute, the number of hours wasted in traffic is increased by more than 500% between 1982 and 2005. Fortunately, a study by McKinsey Global Institute shows that by 2020 traffic data can avoid traffic congestion and save users by $600 billion per year (Lohr, 2011).

Most major cities collect real-time traffic flow (vehicles’ volume and speed), congestion, and accidents’ data on freeways and arterial.3 This data is mainly used to obtained predictions of the traffic patterns and for route planning, especially for emergency services such as police and ambulances. This data is also commercially used by Google, Microsoft, and Apple maps’ services, among many other companies, that create value for their customers by shortening their travel time via providing congestion-aware route planning services (integrated with the GPS and turn-by-turn navigate systems).

Currently, in most countries (including the United States), the traffic data is provided for free to for-profit companies. Due to the success of the commercial services that use the real-time traffic information, several cities are considering generating revenue from the traffic data that is shared with the for-profit companies. For instance, the Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority, has sponsored the Regional Integration of Intelligent Transportation Systems (RIITS)4 network with the goal of collecting and storing traffic data and creating a system that enables the use of stored data for transportation applications. We will refer to this system as Archived Data Management System (ADMS); see also (ADMS, 2009). In addition to real-time information, historical traffic data can be utilized to better predict traffic congestion (Demiryurek et al., 2011).5

In this paper, we consider an abstraction of such environments where data provider offers a “service” at a certain quality. We think of the service, as processed information. Namely, the traffic data is pro-

1http://datamarket.azure.com/browse/data
2http://www.infochimps.com/
3For instance, see http://www.cattlab.umd.edu/?portfolio=ritis.
4http://www.riits.net/.
5(Pan et al., 2012) show that due to a strong temporal correlation present in traffic data, accuracy of traffic prediction can be improved by more than 60% using historical data. see also (Yuan et al., 2011), (Gehrke and Wojtusiak, 2008), (Williams et al., 1998), and (Park et al., 1998).
cessed to offer a prediction of the traffic patterns or congestion. Another example could be congestion-aware route planning services. Our analysis highlights the role of the quality of the provided service. If the service is prediction of the traffic patterns, then the quality corresponds to the accuracy and reliability of the estimates, e.g., travel time. In the context of route planning, the quality corresponds to the difference of the travel time compared with the “optimal” travel time (ideally, the service would find the path with the shortest travel time taking into account the current and future congestion).

The quality of processed information is determined by quality and resolution of raw data and more importantly by the quality and precision of analysis and processes performed on raw data. 6 Naturally, in our model, providing higher quality service would be more costly.

We consider an environment with heterogeneous customers that are differentiated with respect to their “delay-sensitivity”. In other words, a customer of “higher type” are more time sensitive and would prefer a higher quality service.

As the first step towards understanding pricing structures in such data markets, we compare the price of processed information (service) vs. raw data. At the first glance, it might seem that processed information should be priced higher since it costs more. However, we show that the opposite is true.

We consider a monopoly market that consists of a data provider who sells raw data and processed information at a certain quality level to a continuum mass of customers. Any customers who is not satisfied with the quality of processed information can purchase raw data and then investing in obtaining higher quality information. Raw data which has not been subjected to processing or any other manipulations has the potential to become “information”, but, it requires effort and cost. The intuition is that customers (companies) of “higher type”, would purchase raw data and invest in obtaining better (more accurate) predictions of traffic patterns and travel times.

Customers’ decisions on whether or not to buy raw data or processed information depend on their valuations and the cost of processing raw data, as well as price of raw data and processed information. We show that customers with higher valuations have higher perceived value for raw data. Thus, they are willing to purchase raw data rather than processed information. The data provider, in turn, reacts to this observation and sets higher price for raw data compare with processed information. 7 Using this scheme, the data provider obtains a higher profit.

As a next step, we seek to understand how the pricing scheme changes when the data provider competes with other firms.

Considering competition is partly motivated by the aforementioned RIITS project and potentials for public-private partnership. One possibility is to sell raw data to private firms. The private firms add value to raw data and at the same time offset the operational cost of the project. In this situation, RIITS and private firms that sell processed information become competitors in a mixed market.

We consider a market that consists of a data provider and a private firm. The data provider sells raw data to the private firm. The data provider and private firm process raw data possibly at different quality levels and sell processed information to customers. Then, they compete with each other in a vertically differentiated mixed duopoly market. The goal is to obtain insights with regards to the endogenous quality and price choice in this market. Based on our preliminary analysis, we conjecture that value-based pricing scheme is still optimal for this market. That is, raw data that has not undergone costly processes would be priced higher than processed information.

We also consider a variation of the mixed duopoly market in which the data provider has to offer his processed information for free. We show that when a data provider offers free processed information, the private firm should respond by decreasing his quality.

Organization In Section 2, we look at the monopoly market. We discuss the mixed duopoly market Section 3. We conclude this paper in Section 4 with a discussion on future research directions.

2 MONOPOLY MARKET

We consider a market of size m with a monopoly data provider. The data provider sells processed information with quality q at price Pq. As discussed in

6Raw data is usually collected by sensor devices that are installed in the roads. Several researchers have studied sensor architectures and its impact on quality and resolution of raw data; see e.g., (Knaian, 2000), (Tubaishat et al., 2009), and (Klein, 2001).

7As mentioned before, this is rather surprising considering the extra processing cost that the data provide incurs for processed information. Such a pricing scheme is called value-based pricing since it is based on the perceived value rather than the cost structure (cf. (Harmon et al., 2009) and (Shapiro et al., 1999)).

8Note that the mixed market is referred to a market consists of public and private firms (Delbono, 1991) and (Ishibashi and Kaneko, 2008).
the previous section, one can think of quality as the accuracy of the predictions of the traffic patterns and congestions. The cost of processing data for the data provider at quality \( q \) is \( c_1(q) \).

The data provider also sells raw data at price \( P_r \); see the model in Figure 1.

Each customer has a type \( \theta \) which represents the delay sensitivity of the customer. A higher \( \theta \) implies higher value for time, e.g., a stronger preference on choosing the shortest path. We assume that \( \theta \) is independent across customers and is drawn from a distribution \( F \).\(^9\) The valuation of a customer with type \( \theta \) for processed information with quality \( q \) is \( v(q, \theta) \), where \( v \) is increasing in \( q \) and \( \theta \).

Customers can either purchase raw data or processed information. When a customer with type \( \theta \) purchases processed information with quality \( q \) at price \( P_q \), his net utility is given by

\[
v(\theta, q) - P_q \]

We make the following assumption about the valuation function \( v(\theta, q) \).

**Assumption 1.** For any \( q_2 \geq q_1 \) and \( \theta_2 \geq \theta_1 \), the valuation function satisfies the following increasing differences property:

\[
v(\theta_2, q_1) - v(\theta_1, q_1) \leq v(\theta_2, q_2) - v(\theta_1, q_2) \]

This assumption implies that the marginal increment of valuation function is an increasing function of quality. Similar increasing differences assumptions are quite common in the game theory and the equilibrium analysis literature; see (Levin, 2003).

Each customer who purchases raw data can process to obtain information at some quality level.\(^10\) We assume that cost of processing raw data for customers at quality level \( q \) is \( c_2(q) \). Thus, a customer with type \( \theta \) who purchases raw data processes it at quality \( q^0_\theta \geq q \), where \( q^0_\theta \) solves the following optimization problem.

\[
q^0_\theta = \arg \max_{a \geq q} \{ v(\theta, a) - c_2(a) \}.
\]

Thus, the net utility of a customer with type \( \theta \) who purchases raw data at price \( P_r \) is given by

\[
v(\theta, q^0_\theta) - P_r - c_2(q^0_\theta).
\]

**OPTIMAL PRICES AND QUALITY**

We now look at how the data provider determines his prices \( P_r \) and \( P_q \), and quality \( q \). We start with the following proposition.

**Proposition 2.1.** There exists threshold \( \theta_r \) such that only customers with type greater than \( \theta_r \) purchase raw data.

The proof is given in the appendix. According to Proposition 2.1, high type customers will purchase raw data and low type customers will purchase processed information. Then, a customer with type \( \theta \) is indifferent between purchasing raw data and processed information, where \( \theta_r \) satisfies the following equation.

\[
\max_{q} \{ v(\theta_r, q) - c_2(q) \} - P_r = v(\theta_r, q) - P_q
\]

\[
v(\theta_r, q^0_\theta) - c_2(q^0_\theta) - P_r = v(\theta_r, q) - v(\theta_q, q) \tag{1}
\]

Similarly, for a given quality \( q \) and price \( P_q \), customers with type \( \theta_q \) is indifferent between purchasing processed information and not purchasing at all, where \( \theta_q \) solves

\[
v(\theta_q, q) - P_q = 0.
\]

That is, \( P_q = v(\theta_q, q) \).

The data provider chooses \( P_r \), \( P_q \), and \( q \) to maximize his profit, which can be written as follows

\[
\pi = mP_q (F(\theta_r) - F(\theta_q)) - c_1(q) + mP_r (1 - F(\theta_r)),
\]

where \( m \) is the market size. The sum of the first and second terms is profit of processed information and the last term is profit of raw data.

\(^{10}\)These customers only need processed information for their private uses. In Section 3, we consider the case where a private firm purchases raw data, processes it, and sells it to customers.
The following proposition compares $P_r$ and $P_q$ in the optimal solution. Surprisingly, although the data provider incurs an additional cost for processed information, he sets a lower price for it.

**Proposition 2.2.** In the optimal solution, we have $P_r \geq P_q$.

The proof is given in the appendix. In the proof we use that fact that high valuation customers have higher perceived value for raw data.

## 3 MIXED DUOPOLY MARKET

In the previous section, we assume that customers who purchase raw data, only use it for their private uses. Here, we consider the case that customers who purchase raw data, process it, and sell processed information to other customers. More precisely, we consider a duopoly market consists of a data provider and a private firm. The data provider sells raw data at price $P_r$ to the private firm. The private firm processes the data and sells it to the customers. We assume that the data provider and the private firm compete with each other in a vertically differentiated duopoly market. That is, they sell processed information to customers at different qualities and prices. Without loss of generality, we assume that the private firm sells processed information with a higher quality than the data provider.

Figure 2 illustrates the model. In the figure $q_1$ and $q_2$ are respectively quality of processed information for the data provider and the private firm. Furthermore, the data provider and the private firm sell processed information at price $P_1$ and $P_2$, respectively. Finally, $P_r$ is the price that the private firm pays for raw data.

Since in context of traffic data, the data provider is a public firm, we consider a more general model in which the data provider maximizes a convex combination of his profit and social welfare, i.e., $\beta W + (1 - \beta)\pi_1$, where $\beta \in [0, 1]$ and $W$ is social welfare. When the data provider wants to maximize his profit, he sets $\beta$ to zero. However, counterintuitively, we show that due to the game between the data provider and the private firm, social welfare is not maximized at $\beta = 1$. In other words, the data provider should consider his profit is his objective function. Otherwise he cannot yield the highest social welfare.

In the following, we summarize the timing of the game between the data provider and private firm.

1- The data provider decides about his objective function or more precisely parameter $\beta \in [0, 1]$.
2- The data provider sells raw data at price $P_r$ to the private firm. The private firm can choose not to buy the raw data.
3- The data provider and the private firm simultaneously make a decision about quality of their services.
4- After the quality levels are realized, both firm determine their prices.

For this game we explicitly analyze the endogenous quality and price choice in a backward manner. Precisely, we first establish the pricing strategy of the firms, and then we find their quality strategies. Due to the space limit, in the following we only summarize our finding.

**Pricing Strategies** Our preliminary analysis show that the data provider increases his price when the private firm does and vice versa. Furthermore, the private firm increases his price when he improves his quality, and he reacts with a lower price when the data provider offers a higher quality. However, the data provider does not always increase his price when he improves his quality. He raises his price when there is enough gap between his offered quality and quality of the private firm. We further conjecture that price of raw data is higher than price of processed information as long as the market size is large enough.

**Quality Strategies** The private firm reacts with a higher quality against an increase in quality of the data provider. But, in some cases, when the private firm improves his quality, the data provider is not willing to increase his quality. This encourages customers

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11 The social welfare is the sum of surplus of customers and both firms.
to purchase higher quality data from the private firm. Our preliminary results show that the quality of the data provider and private firm is increasing in $\beta$.

**Free Data** We also investigate the case, where the data provider offers processed information for free – this is similar to the current practice where the real-time traffic information is offered at no cost. Interestingly, in that case, the private firm has less incentive to increase his quality. In other words, the private firm provides lower quality compare to the case that the data provider prices his data. This, in turn, decreases social welfare. We conjecture that with free processed information, the data provider needs to ignore his profit to maximize social welfare. Precisely, when the data provider does not price his data, welfare-maximizing $\beta$ is exactly one.

### 4 FUTURE DIRECTIONS

In addition to completing our analysis for the aforementioned monopoly and duopoly, we would like to study other pricing strategies in data markets. A natural future step is to compare subscription and consumption-based pricing schemes similar to those currently used in cloud computing, for instance by Amazon’s EC2 platform. In a consumption-based pricing model, customers pay according to the resources used. The resource can be the amount of data they acquire. However, in subscription-based pricing models, customers commit to the service for specified periods of time and pay a flat fee for that period.

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raw data rather than processed information, we have with higher types would also buy raw data. Considering the fact that the left hand side is $P_r$ and the right hand side is $P_q$, the proof is complete. □

Proof of Proposition 2.2. By Eq. (1), the price of raw data is $\max_{a \geq q} \{v(\theta_r, a) - c(a)\} + v(\theta_q, q) - v(\theta_r, q)$. Then, the profit of the data provider can be written as

$$\pi = m (F(\theta_r) - F(\theta_q)) \times v(\theta_q, q) - c(\theta_r) + m (1 - F(\theta_r)) \times \left( \max_{a \geq q} \{v(\theta_r, a) - c(a)\} + v(\theta_q, q) - v(\theta_r, q) \right)$$

Note that profit of the data provider is a function of $\theta_r$, $\theta_q$, and $q$. Assume that the data provider has already decided about $q$ and $\theta_q$. Then, he is sure that at least $m \times (1 - F(\theta_q))$ customers are willing to pay for processed information if $\theta_r$ is chosen so large that no customer considers buying raw data. In that case, he would earn

$$m (1 - F(\theta_q)) v(\theta_q, q)$$

Therefore, having customers who purchase raw data is beneficial for the data provider if

$$m (F(\theta_r) - F(\theta_q)) \times v(\theta_q, q) - c(\theta_r) + m (1 - F(\theta_r)) \times \left( \max_{a \geq q} \{v(\theta_r, a) - c(a)\} + v(\theta_q, q) - v(\theta_r, q) \right)$$

$$\geq m \times (1 - F(\theta_q)) \times v(\theta_q, q) - c(\theta_r)$$

or equivalently $\max_{a \geq q} \{v(\theta_r, a) - c(a)\} + v(\theta_q, q) - v(\theta_r, q) \geq v(\theta_q, q)$. Considering the fact that the left hand side is $P_r$ and the right hand side is $P_q$, the proof is complete. □

APPENDIX

Proof of Proposition 2.1. We show that if a customer with type $\theta_1$ purchases raw data, then any customers with higher types would also buy raw data.

Since a customer with type $\theta_1$ prefers to purchase raw data rather than processed information, we have

$$\max_{a \geq q} \{v(\theta_1, a) - c_2(a)\} - P_r \geq v(\theta_1, q) - P_q$$

$$v(\theta_1, q_\theta^r) - c_2(q_\theta^r) - v(\theta_1, q) \geq P_r - P_q$$

By Assumption 1, for any $\theta_2 > \theta_1$, we have

$$v(\theta_1, q_\theta^r) - v(\theta_1, q) \leq v(\theta_2, q_\theta^r) - v(\theta_2, q)$$

Therefore,

$$v(\theta_2, q_\theta^r) - c_2(q_\theta^r) - v(\theta_2, q) \geq P_r - P_q$$

Considering the fact that

$$v(\theta_2, q_\theta^r) - c_2(q_\theta^r) \leq \max_{a \geq q} \{v(\theta_2, a) - c_2(a)\},$$

we obtain

$$\max_{a \geq q} \{v(\theta_2, a) - c_2(a)\} - v(\theta_2, q) \geq P_r - P_q,$$

which is the desired result. □